Council conclusions on ensuring the continued pursuit of an effective EU policy on the new challenges presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems

FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting
Luxembourg, 21 October 2013

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

– The EU New Lines for Action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems were adopted by the Council in December 2008 and extended by the Foreign Affairs Council of 13 December 2010 for a further period of two years.

– By providing a concrete framework for collective EU commitment to the fight against proliferation, the New Lines have made it possible to concentrate the efforts of the Member States and European institutions on ambitious actions such as the review and strengthening of our export controls on dual-use items, the setting up of European training for the fight against proliferation, enhanced consular and scientific vigilance, and even the creation of a network of specialist think tanks on these issues.

– However, much remains to be done to achieve a fully efficient, collective approach to fighting proliferation by the EU.

– The threat presented by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as identified in the European Security Strategy of 2003, has not diminished and presents a growing risk to the EU's security environment. It is taking on new dimensions that represent challenges to which the EU must respond effectively: new communication tools allowing easier acquiring of sensitive knowledge and know-how by proliferators; new proliferation pathways; and the rapid development of science and technology, which facilitates the design of weapons of mass destruction.
In order to deal with these evolving and new challenges, the Council concluded the following and invites all relevant EU institutional actors and the Member States to take effective action to achieve the following objectives, with a view to presenting an implementation report within two years:

1. Effectively protecting the access to proliferation-sensitive knowledge and know-how in the EU, and ensuring their peaceful use, in particular through:
   - further enhancing consular vigilance and cooperation;
   - further strengthening protection of our scientific and technical assets against unintended transfers of sensitive technology and know-how, including dual-use items;
   - creating a climate of awareness in scientific, academic and industrial circles, including through enhanced communication efforts and outreach.

2. Addressing new proliferation pathways through further:
   - strengthening of legislative provisions and law enforcement provisions on the criminalisation of activities linked to proliferation, and encouraging a better coordination and promotion of European efforts in this area;
   - enhancing political resolve and EU action, including exchange of best practices, in accordance with the objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), with a particular focus on maritime flows in the Mediterranean basin, and, where necessary, strengthening the legal framework.

3. Addressing proliferation flows not directly transiting the EU, including through:
   - enhanced financial vigilance, in particular through proactive outreach to financial institutions and third countries and improved cooperation mechanisms such as the OECD Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on proliferation financing, to impede flows using European currencies or accounts, but not materially transiting through the EU;
   - enhanced awareness amongst our partners outside the EU, making use of the various forms of international cooperation in which the EU is involved, including the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence network;
   - increased exchange of best practices, as appropriate, including with regard to the security of WMD-related sensitive information.

4. Reacting to rapid developments in science, technology and communication which provide proliferators with easier access to the knowledge and know-how required for the design of weapons of mass destruction by proactively adapting EU instruments for combating proliferation, such as:
   - regular updates of the tools for combating proliferation (list of prohibited or controlled goods), in line with the decisions made within the multinational treaty frameworks created (Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) / Zangger Committee, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (aCPPPM), International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT,) international export control regimes (Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)), relevant UNSC resolutions (e.g. UNSCR 1540) and, where appropriate, national legislation;
strengthened export controls, to control both tangible and intangible transfers of technology and information that could be used in proliferating weapons of mass destruction and their delivery, as well as to prevent proliferation financing and shipments and to secure sensitive materials;

– a constant effort directed towards the prevention of all sorts of CBRN risks, based in particular on the 2009 EU CBRN Action Plan, and a needs assessment and constant evaluation of the implementation of that plan, including an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the national provisions currently in place.

5. Continue and enhance dialogues on the most important non-proliferation issues and concerns with third countries.

6. Continue EU support for the work of the International Science and Technology Centre."